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the selection would be state-wide rather than local and often secret. This
agency would also facilitate the adoption of children from other sources
such as the Wyoming State Children's Home, the State Home for Dependent
Children, private child-caring agencies, Industrial Institutes for Boys and
Girls, foster homes and private homes.
Under existing laws, if the parents do not want to care for their child,
the court or County Commissioners should be informed in order that they
might obtain the consent of the parents to have the child adopted, or
declare the child abandoned and provide for its adoption.
In summary, looking at the adoption problem through the eyes of the
Welfare Department, the County Attorney, and the District Judge, the
following specific suggestions are urged:
1. That statutory changes be made so that finality in adoption proceedings based on abandonment will be achieved.
2. That the welfare of the child be made the primary consideration in
adoption proceedings, with all else secondary.
3. That a proceeding resulting in a "termination of parental rights"
be created in order to streamline adoption procedures in abandonment
cases and "vicious and immoral environment" cases.
4. That a single state agency be created through which all adoptions
must be channelled.
MERLE

B.

CASE

OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING WYOMING STATUTES

RELATING TO ADOPTION BASED ON ABANDONMENT

Abandonment of children (or its equivalent, desertion) is mentioned
in no less than ten different Wyoming statutes. Some of these directly
relate to adoption and others do not. In order to get the complete statutory
picture on abandonment of children we shall at the outset of this article
mention and briefly characterize all of the statutes having to do with
abandonment. References are to Sections of Wyoming Compiled Statutes,
1945, unless otherwise noted.
The following "abandonment statutes" directly relate to adoption:
58-213, 58-214, 58-113, 58-217 and 58-609.
The first of these provides that orphans and abandoned children may
be adopted, and that the County Commissioners may provide for such
adoptions in loco parentis. In the case of parents "abandoning their
children, without providing for their support and education" the Commissioners are given the same authority as if the parents were dead, except
that if the residence of the parents is known, the Commissioners are re-
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quired to notify them to take the children away or provide for them; and
"if the parents do not claim such children" within three months after the
notice is given, the Commissioners may provide for their adoption as if they
were orphans. 58-214 covers the details of reclamation. The process of
adopting orphans obviously does not and cannot involve the obtaining
of consent from parents, for there are none; hence, if abandonment is
established, and the County Commissioners take over, 58-206 and 58-207
would seem not to apply.
It is necessary to digress for a moment in order to consider the two
statutes last mentioned. They are set out in full in the footnote.' It will
be observed that these statutes, in terms, apply only to nonconsenting living
parents. If abandonment can be established, and if abandoned children
may be adopted as if they were orphans, then no consent nor any notice
under 58-206 and 58-207 should be required to effect a valid adoption. No
Wyoming case exists in which abandonment was determined by a court
in a proceeding separate from the adoption proceeding itself. Where the
two are combined (as in Lucas v. Strasuer)2 it is obviously necessary to
notify the parents under 58-206 and 58-207 in the course of the adoption
proceeding. This unnecessarily complicates the proceeding and increases
the uncertainty of its outcome. If there has been no abandonment and
the parents will not consent, there can be no adoption. It is therefore
suggested that persons hoping to obtain an adoption based upon abandonment proceed first to secure a finding of abandonment, and then institute
the adoption proceeding, relying upon 57-213. Such a finding could
follow the expiration of the three month period allowed for reclamation
of the child by its parents, if desired, but it should logically precede the
giving of notice to reclaim the child.
58-113 provides that whenever a district court is satisfied that a minor
child has been "deserted" by its parents, and that it has no legal guardian,
the child may be adopted as if an orphan. If the term "deserted" is synnonymous with "abandoned", the effect of this statute would be the same as
1.

2.

"When a petition is filed and presented to the district judge, praying for the adoption
of a child or children, unless said petition is accompanied with the written consent
of the living parents of said child, such judge shall by written order set such petition
for hearing and require such parents who are living to appear on the day set and
show cause why such petition should not be granted and an order of adoption made
thereon." Section 58-206, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945.
"A copy of the petition and the order made thereon shall be served on the
parents of such child who have not consented to the adoption, who can be found
in the state, at least ten (10) days before the day specified in the order of hearing.
When such parents cannot be found in the state, and such fact is made to appear
by affidavit of one of the petitioners for adoption, setting forth the last known
address of such living parents, such order shall be published once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in a newspaper of general publication in the county, as the
court may direct, the last publication to be at least twenty (20) days before the
time appointed for the hearing, and a copy of said notice shall be immediately
mailed to the last known address of said parent. Parents served personally or by
publication as herein provided, shall be bound by the findings and judgment of
the court respecting such adoption as defendants served with process in a civil
action." Section 58-207, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945.
Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).
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58-213, and after desertion has been established, no notice to or consent
by the parents would be needed. Corpus Juris3 defines' abandonment to
4
be a total desertion. Desertion is defined in Corpus Juris as "a word
uniformily used to denote a willful abandonment of an employment or
duty in violation of a legal or mroal obligation." Bouvier's Law Dictionary
describes desertion as "the act by which a man abandons his wiie or
children, or either of them." -It is therefore believed that so far as the
present problem in concerned, the words are quite synonymous and may
be used interchangeably.
But there is no denying the existence of a conflict between the notice
and consent requirements of 58-206 and 58-207, and the permission given
by 58-213 and 58-113 to proceed, where there has been abandonment, as
if the child were an orphan-which would dispense with the necessity of
notice or consent. 58-206 begins:
"When a petition is filed and presented to the district judge,
praying for the adoption of a child or children, unless said petition
is accompanied with the written consent of the living parents of
said children, etc.,"
the hearing must be set, order to show cause issued, and a copy of the
petition and order served or published. This conflict is one of the statutory "kinks" connected with abandonment which should be. straightened
out.
The fourth statute directly relating to adoption based on abandonment
is 58-217. According to this section, the State Board of Charities and
Reform may consent to the adoption of any child who has been committed
to the "Wyoming State Children's Home" and who has remained there
for at least one year.. This the board may do without the consent of the
parents of the child, and "said consent by said Board shall be -as valid,
binding and legally effective as though made by the natural parents . . .
of said child." Here, again are possibilities of conflict with 58-206 and
58-207.
The "Wyoming State Children's Home" is evidently the home at
Casper called the "Home for Orphan and Dependent Children" (see 19-201
and 19-202 as amended). How may children be committed to this Home?
(1) 58-108 permits a finding by a dsitrict court that a minor under 14
years of age "is without a guardian and is entirely abandoned by his parents." Under 58-110 the court may commit him to a "home for children".
This apparently includes the Wyoming State Children's Home. (Here
again is a provision for certain action which may be taken upon an abandonment being established). (2) 58-696 defines "dependent children" as including persons of either sex under 16 who are "abandoned". (This definition conflicts somewhat with the defintion set out in 25-101.)
They
3.
4.

1 Corpus Juris 5.
18 Corpus Juris 969.
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evidently could be committed to the Wyoming State Children's Home.
They also can be committed to a private child-caring agency, (58-609)
which, as we shall see, has the authority to consent to their adoption. (3)
A child could come to the Wyoming State Children's Home, or to a child
caring agency, through the operation of 58-501, as well.
The final statute directly relating to abandonment and adoption is
58-609. This section is found among the statutes relating to delinquent
and dependent children, and has to do with powers and duties of childcaring agencies, societies or institutions. These are private agencies,
elaborately defined and regulated by 58-608 to 58-616, inclusive. By
58-609 (1), child-caring agencies are given the power to consent to loco
parentis to the adoption of dependent children committed to their care
by the courts. As we have already noted, abandoned children are probably
included in the definition of dependent children. This consent may be
given "where such action is deemed proper and desirable." Deemed by
whom? Presumably it would be the governing board of the child-caring
agency.
58-609 (4) provides that
"when foundlings or other abandoned children whose parentage is unknown, and who have not been assigned by a court order
to a child-caring organization are presented for adoption, the judge
having jursidiction in the county of the residence of the parties
desiring to adopt may record his consent in loco parentis."
Here we have even the judge standing in loco parentis. The quoted
language "foundlings or other abandoned children whose parentage is
unknown" seems to exclude cases in which parents are known to be living,
hence the section does not help to solve the problem of consents of living
parents. It may be observed, however, that this Section is in part a statute
providing for the adoption of orphan children, and, as such, would be in
conflict with 58-213-another "statutory kink" which should be straightened
out.
So much for "abandonment statutes" directly relating to adoption. The
following additional statutes do not directly concern adoption but do
pertain to abandoned children:
58-101 makes it unlawful for parents of a child u nder 19 years of age
to "negligently or knowingly abandon or fail to provide the necessities of
life for such child". By 58-104, violation is made a misdemeanor, with a
fine of not more than $1,000 and/or a jail sentence not exceeding 12 months.
58-108 authorizes the district court to appoint a guardian for a child
under 14 who has no guardian "and is entirely abandoned" by his parents.
Whenever a parent has been convicted or violating 58-101, "any person" may apply to the district court (accroding to 58-110) to have a guardian
of the abandoned child appointed. The .court may appoint a guardian, or
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place the child in a children's home. It may also enter a support order
against the parents.
The 1953 Legislature enacted a statute (Session Laws of 1953, Chapter
134) which provides among other things that any person legally responsible
for the support of a child under 18 who shall abandon or desert the child
shall be liable to a civil action, supported by attachment, and leading to a
money judgment for expenses incurred by the plaintiff for the support of
the child, plus a decree for future support. This statute is the subject of
another article appearing in this issue of the Journal.
58-501 provides that a petition may be presented to the district court
setting forth that there is in the county "any child deserted by one or both
of its parents" who 'has no suitable home or abode, and asking for the
appointment of a gurdian. Notice and order to show cause are to be served
on the parents. At the hearing the court may appoint a guardian or commit
the child to a Children's Home or child-caring agency.
These many statutes relating to abandoned children clearly indicate
the concern which our legislature has expressed with the subject of abandonment of children. Yet the legislature has nowhere defined abandonment,
nor has it provided a definite procedure by which abandonment may be
determined. We submit that both of these things should be done, and that
when they are done, a long step will have been taken toward clarifying the
status of adoptions based upon abandonment.
In Wyoming's leading case, Lucas v. Strauser,5 the court said, "Evidence
of abandonment must show conduct on the part of the parent from which
it can be resonably inferred that it was his purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claim to the children." An Ohio court
stated 6 that abandonment, so as to dispense 'with consent, must be "willful"
and there must be a "settled intent" to renounce permanently the rights
and duties of parenthood. In addition to the elements of abandonment set
out in the, two aforementioned cases, perhaps it would be desirable to go
further and enact a statute setting a time limit after which the neglect of
all parental duties will ripen into abandonment. This very result has
already been effected, under limited circumstances, by 58-217. An Oregon
statute states that if any person leaves the state and shall fail, for the period
of sixty days, to provide necessary food, shelter, care, and clothing for his
children, it shall be prima facie evidence that such person abandoned his
children. 7 A North Dakota statute8 provides that where the child has been
in the home of the persons wishing to adopt the child for a period of two
years, there shall be an automatic legal abandonment terminating all
claims of the natural parents. Persons more concerned with the rights of
the parents state that time proscriptions and intent seem contradictory, and
5.

Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).

6.

In re Gates, 84 Ohio App. 269, 85 N.E.2d 597 (1948).

7.

Ore. Comp. Laws 1940, Title 23, Sec. 1043.

8.

N.D. Rev. Code, Title 14, sec. 1116 (1943 as amended 1949).
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that time may be evidence of intent but should never be conclusive evidence
of intent.9 In the case of In re Bistany,o where the parents left their child
with her aunt for upwards of two years and furnished nothing except some
slight gifts, there was held to be no abandonment because the parents did
not "intend" to relinquish their rights to the child. But those concerned
with welfare of the child ask the question, "Of what importance to a child
is it that his parents did not intend to rob him of the health and security of
a home, if such a home is not provided?" A compromise between the rights
of the parent and the welfare of the child could be effected by a statute
which places the burden of proof upon the parent in proving that abandonment has not taken place where the neglect of parental duties to the child
has gone beyond the prescribed period of time. A suggested statute taking
in the elements of abandonment as well as the time proscription is as follows:
"Any parent or guardian who, at some point of time, willfully
and intentionally renounces, or by his or her acts, relinquishes
all parental duties and claims to his or her children or children
in his or her care, shall be deemed to have abandoned such children. Where any parent or guardian fails to provide the necessary
shelter, food, care, and clothing for his or her children or children
in his or her care for a period of one year, such action shall be
presumptive evidence that such person has abandoned such children and the burden of proof in such case shall be upon the parent
or guardian, whichever the case may be."
The above statute, by providing a period beyond which the child is presumed to be abandoned, does not conflict with the .theory of intent which
is deemed to be a basic element of abandonment,1 1 in that when the time
proscription has expired, such is not conclusive evidence of abandonment
but only presumptive evidence, which casts upon the parent deemed to
have abandoned the child the burden of proving that he or she did not
intend to abandon the child.
A second desirable statutory change would be to resolve the apparent
conflict between the authority conferred upon the various persons and
organizations to give the consent to adoption of abandoned children in
loco parentis, and the parental notice and hearing procedure required by
58-206 and 58-207. The latter should not be required when abandonment
has been judically determined, or when some person or organization has
authority to give consent in loco parentis.
As the law now stands, it should be possible to institute a separate
proceeding in the Juvenile Court having as its object a finding and decree
that a child has been abandoned. Section 1-703 (a2) of the Wyoming
Juvenile Court Act provides:
"The Court shall have jurisdiction in all proceedings instituted therein or transferred to it by order of the District Court con9.

Comment, 60 Yale L.J. 1240 (1950).

10.

In re Bistany, 209 App. Div. 286, 204 N.Y.S. 599 (1924).

11.

"Intention is the first and paramount object of inquiry; for there can be no abandonment without the intention to abandon." 1 Corpus Juris 6.
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cerning any chlid living or found within the district who is
abandoned by his parent or other custodian."
As the above Section points out, the Wyoming Juvenile Court does have
jurisdiction where the parent is alleged to have abandoned the minor
child; however, such jurisdiction does not extend to adoption cases. One
of the primary reasons for the creation of the juvenile court was to preserve
the family group. Such courts have gained a great deal of the necessary
knowledge and experience needed in dealing with the problems concerning
the parent and child and therefore would seem much better qualified to
handle the question of abandonment. Such action brought in the juvenile
court is kept within the court,-which tends to keep public opinion, due to
excessive publicity, from having an unnecessary influence upon the case.
In an abandonment proceeding, Would due process of law demand
that notice and opportunity to be heard be given to the parents? A Texas
case, D'unger v. Timon, 12 states by way of dictum that "parental custodial
rights come within the protection of the due process clause of the 14th,
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section
19, of the Constitution of Texas."
In the case of Sullivan v. People,13 where the parent was charged with
having abandoned his child for the space of six years, the lower court
found the parent guilty of the charge without giving such parent any
notice of an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court of Illinois in
reversing the lower court decree said:
"A court cannot be clothed with authority to decree that a
parent has deserted or abandoned his child and forfeited his rights
without notice to him and that to divest his rights without notice
and opportunity to be heard is not only contrary to every principle
of natural justice but in prohibited by the constitution."
A decree of adoption was held to be of no effect in the case of Schiltz
v. Roenit, 14 where the father of the child sought to be adopted had received
no notice of the charge of abandonment and no opportunity to be heard.
The court said:
... due process of law under the 14th Amendment as applied
to judicial proceedings, includes a charge of abandonment or
whatever the charge may be, and notice to the party in some form,
either actual or constructive, and opportunity to appear and
produce evidence in his defense by himself or counsel. To proceed
to adjudicate in the absence of notice to the party would be contrary to the first principle of the social impact amd of the right
of the administration of justice."
A New York case, Re Livingston,1 5 states:
12.
18.

D'unger v. Timon, 260 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. 1953).
Sullivan v. People, 224 Ill.
468, 79 N.E. 695 (1906).

14.

Schlitz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N.W. 194, 21 L.R.A. 493 (1893).

15.

Re Livingston, 135 N.Y. 328 (1912).
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"That to hold that the state may permit its courts to determine, without notice to the parent, that he has forfeited his
natural rights to the custody of his child is nothing less than to
consent that the powers of the state over the child are, in their
nature, legally superior to the natural rights of the parent."
Assuming that notice and opportunity to be heard are indispensable
to due process in an abandonment proceeding, it would certainly be more
desirable for rather obvious reasons, "to have it out" with the parents in
a separate proceeding than to have the issue raised and fought out in an
adoption proceeding. The latter should not be complicated by the abandonment issue.
If an abandonment proceeding, including notice to parents, be instituted in the Juvenile Court, a snag might be encountered in the provisions of
Section 1-709 of the Wyoming Juvenile Court Act which states as follows:
"Service of orders issued in proceedings hereunder where this
statute requires personal service shall be made within three (3)
days. If the parent is a non-resident or personnel service cannot
be had within said three-day period, service shall be had by
registered mail to the last known address, but service by publication shall not be permissible. Where the service on the parent
cannot be had, and there is no other legal guardian for the child,
the court is hereby empowered to appoint a guardian to serve upon
terms and for such time as the court shall direct."
As the above Section points out, service by publication cannot be had
where the proceeding takes place in the Juvenile Court; and where personal service cannot be had upon the parent within the three day limit, a
guardian is appointed and is served. It could hardly be contended that
service upon such a guardian, in an abandonment proceeding, would bind
a living parent, or constitute the notice and opportunity to be heard
essential to due process, since these rights are personal to the parent.
The alternatives would be to amend the Juvenile Court Act to include
service by publication, or to provide for an abandonment proceeding in
the district court.
The State of Maryland is said to have model adoption statutes. These
may be summarized as follows: When a petition requesting adoption of a
child is filed with an appropriate Maryland Court, such court may, at its
discretion, appoint a child welfare agency or a designated officer of the
court to make a thorough investigation of all matters concerning the child,
the person petitioning for the adoption, the parents of the child and many
other related factors. 1 If, at the end of such investigation, the investigation report contains a recommendation stating that it would be for the
"best interest" of the minor child that the petitioner for the adoption of
the child should have the custody of the child for a trial period, the court
shall, upon a hearing had, pass an interlocutory decree of adoption granting
16.

Md. Ann. Code, Art. 16, sec. 84 (1951).
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the petitioner the temporary custody of the child for a limited time period
not exceeding one year. The court in the meantime retains jurisdiction of
the case and takes such action as in its discretion it may deem to be in the
best interests of the child. 17 The legal effect of such interlocutory decree
of adoption is that during the trial period the child is to all intents and
purposes the child of the petitioner, and the natural parents are divested of
all rights with respect to the child.' 8 Before the end of the trial period,
if the court is satisfied that the best interests of the child will be promoted,
the court shall pass a final decree of adoption 19 which has the legal effect
20
of confirming the interlocutory decree.
The advantages of the Maryland system may be summarized as follows:
(1) The final decree issued by the court is final and binding.21 An adoption
decree which is later upset (as in Lucas v. Strauser),22 works a great
hardship upon the child and the adopting parents.
(2) The controlling element is the welfare of the child rather than any
23
parental right.
(3) But the rights of the parents are not totally forgotten; as the Maryland
adoption statutes point out, before the child can be legally adopted
a thorough investigation of all matters is carried out and such investigation includes the rights of the parents. A hearing is also had
which also considers the rights of the parents.
(4) As a Maryland case, White v. Seward,2 4 points out, the burden of proof
is upon the adopting parents to show that the best interests of the
child would be promoted by severing its ties from its natural parents.
It is to be noted that the Maryland statutes apparently do not expressly cover the problem of desertion or abandonment. But it is submitted
that abandonment could be considered as possibly included within the
framework of the Maryland Statutes, along with all other factors involved
in an adoption proceedings, since the welfare of the child is made the
primary consideration in Maryland adoption proceedings. If a choice must
be made between the rights of the parents and the best interests of the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Md. Ann. Code, Art. 16, sec. 85 (1951).
Md. Ann. Code, Art. 16, sec. 86 (1951).
Md. Ann. Code, Art. 16, sec. 87 (1951).
Md. Ann. Code, Art 16, sec. 88 (1951).
"In adoption cases a decree will not be revoked after it is enrolled in the absence
of fraud, mistake, surprise or irregularity in its obtention, but it will be considered
as final and binding and the court is not thenceforth vested with continuous auth-

ity to entertain petitions for a new decree on proof of altered circumstances of
Faleck v. Chadwick, 190 Md. 462, 59

either the natural or the adoptive parent."
A.2d 187 (1948).

22.

23.

24.

An adoption decree which had been in effect for two years and two months was
declared void by the court after hearing evidence from the natural parent to the
effect that the father had not abandoned his children. Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98,
196 P.2d 862 (1948).
The case was decided on the question as to whether the best interests and welfare
of the child would be promoted by the adoption. Atkins v. Gose, 189 Md. 542,
56 A.2d 697 (1947-48).

White v. Seward, 187 Md. 43, 48 A.2d 335, 337 (1946).
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child, we submit that the interests of the child should be paramount, even
though in extreme cases the neglect of the child is involuntary.
Summary of Suggested Statutory Changes
In the light of the foregoing, it is suggested that the following changes
be made in the Wyoming Statutes relating to the adoption of abandoned
children:
(1) That a statutory definition of what constitutes abandonment be
formulated which pertains to all children under 18 years of age, and includes in particular the specification of a minimum period of time beyond
which so-called "temporary" abandonment be presumed to be permanentin order to give the court some encouragement to make a finding of
abandonment, and to protect such a finding from the reappearance of
parents who suddenly develop the whim to reclaim their children.
(2) That a special proceeding leading to a decree or finding of
abandonment or termination of parental rights, based upon notice to
parents, and including a hearing, te established.
(3) That Sections 58-206 and 58-207 be amended so as not to apply to:
(a) Adoptions based on abandonments judically ascertained in
proceedings outlined in (2) above, or
(b) Adoptions in which existing statutes authorize organizations and persons other than parents to consent to the
adoption in loco parentis.
(4) That the statutes pertaining to the adoption of orphan children
(particularly 58-213 and 58-609[4]) be harmonized and made uniform.
(5) That the words "deserted" in 58-113 and 58-501 be changed to
"abandoned", and that the references to abandonment in all existing
Statutes be made uniform (e.g., "entirely abandoned" in 59-11K "abandoned
children, whose parentage is unknown" in 58-609 [4], "abandoning their
children, without providing for their support and education" in 58-213).
(6) That the conflict in the definitions of dependent children-at
least so far as abandoned children are concerned-set out in 58-606 and
25-101 be resolved.
(7) That there be a declaration of legislative policy to the effect that
in an adoption proceeding, the welfare of the child shall be the primary
consideration, with consent of the parents as secondary.
ARTHUR F. FISHER
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